A new translation of John Paul II's classic work

LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

KAROL WOJTYŁA

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Karol Wojtyła

Translation, Endnotes, and Foreword
by Grzegorz Ignatik

Pauline
BOOKS & MEDIA
Boston

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Chapter I

The Person and the Drive

Part One

Analysis of the Verb "to use"

The person as the subject and object of action

The world in which we live consists of many objects. The word "object" in this case signifies more or less the same as "a being" (*byt*).[1] This is not the proper meaning of this word, for properly speaking an "object" signifies what is posited in relation to some "subject." The subject is also a being—a being that in some way exists and acts. It can be said accordingly that the world in which we live consists of many subjects. It would even be suitable to speak about subjects before objects. If this order has been reversed here, this was done in order to emphasize from the first words of this book objectivity, and realism together with it. For when we start from the subject, and in particular from man as the subject, then it is easy to treat everything else that is located outside the subject, namely the whole world of objects, in a merely subjective way, that is, inasmuch as this world reaches the subject's consciousness, lives in it, and embeds itself in it. It must be clearly recognized from the beginning that every subject is at the same time an objective being, that it is an objective something or somebody.*

* "In the field of experience man appears as a particular '*suppositum*' and at the same time as a concrete 'I,' each time unique and unrepeatable. It is the experience of man in a twofold meaning at once, for the one *who* experiences is man, and he *whom* the subject of experience experiences is also man—man as the subject and the object at the same time. The objectivity of experience belongs to its essence, as experience is always of 'something' or of 'somebody,' and hence the man-subject is given in experience also in an objective way. Experience in a sense ousts in human cognition the notion of 'pure subjectivity' ('pure consciousness'), or rather it summons all this, which deepened our knowledge about man on the basis of this notion to the dimensions of objective reality" (K. Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota" [The Person: Subject and Community], *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, fasc. 2 [1976], 7. [Herein after cited as "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota"].) In *Osoba i czyn* (*Person and Act*) the author takes up the analysis of many facts from the sphere of the dynamic whole "man acts," the facts that preserve their real objectivity only in man's subjectivity. Justified limits to the fear of falling into subjectivism must be set in the name of precisely these facts.

Man is objectively a "somebody"—and this distinguishes him from the rest of the beings of the visible world, the beings that objectively are always merely "something." This simple, elementary distinction conceals a deep abyss that divides the world of persons from the world of things. The objective world, to which we belong, consists of persons and things. A thing is customarily considered a being that is deprived not only of reason, but also of life; a thing is an inanimate object. We will hesitate to call an animal or even a plant a thing. However, nobody speaks convincingly about an animal person. Instead, one speaks about animal individuals, regarding them simply as specimens of a given animal species. And such a description suffices. Yet, it is not sufficient to speak of man as an individual of the species *Homo sapiens*. The word "person" has been coined in order to stress that man cannot be reduced wholly to what is contained in the concept of a "specimen of the species," but has in himself something more, some particular fullness and perfection of being. To emphasize this fullness and perfection the word "person" must necessarily be used.

The most proximate and the most proper reason for this is the fact that man possesses reason, that he is a rational being, which by no means can be stated about any other being of the visible world, for in none of them do we encounter any trace of conceptual thinking. What issued hence is the well-known definition of Boethius, according to which the person is simply an individual of a rational nature (*individua substantia rationalis naturae*).[2] This distinguishes the person in the whole world of objective beings; this constitutes the person's distinctness.

The fact that the person is an individual of a rational nature—that is, an individual to whose nature reason belongs—makes the person at the same time the only subject of its kind among the whole world of beings, a subject that differs completely from subjects such as animals, i.e., beings (especially some of them) that are relatively most similar to man with respect to their bodily constitution. Speaking somewhat descriptively, it must be said that the person as a subject differs from even the most perfect animals by his *interiority* and a specific life, which is concentrated in it, i.e., an interior life. One cannot speak about this life in the case of animals, even though bio-physiological processes, which are similar to man's and which are related to the constitution that is more or less similar to that of man, take place inside their organisms.

On the basis of this constitution a more or less abundant sensual life develops in them—a life whose functions extend far beyond the elementary vegetation of plants and sometimes deceptively resemble the typical functions of human life: cognition (*poznanie*) and desire (*pożądanie*), or, speaking somewhat more broadly about the former function, striving (*dążenie*).

Cognition and desire in man take on a spiritual character, and therefore they contribute to the formation of the true interior life, which does not occur in animals. The interior life is the spiritual life. It focuses on truth and the good. It also deals with a multitude of problems; it seems that the most central of these are the following two: what is the final cause of everything, and how to be good and possess the fullness of the good. The first of these central problems of man's interior life primarily engages cognition, whereas the other one engages desire, or rather striving. Besides, both of these functions seem to be something more than functions; they are rather some natural orientations of the whole man-being. It is remarkable that precisely through his interiority and interior life man not only is a person, but at the same time mostly through them inheres in the objective world, in the "external" world, where he inheres in the manner proper and characteristic to him. The person is an objective being, which, as a definite subject, most closely contacts the whole (external) world and most thoroughly inheres in it precisely through his interiority and interior life. It must be added that he contacts in this way not only the visible world, but also the invisible one, and above all God. And this is another manifestation of the person's distinctness in the visible world.

The contact of the person with the objective world, with reality, is not merely "biological" (*przyrodniczy*), physical, as is the case with all other creations of nature (*przyroda*), nor only sensual, as is the case with animals.[3] The human person, as a distinctly definite subject, establishes contact with other beings precisely through his interiority, whereas the whole "biological" contact, which also belongs to him—for the person possesses a body and even in a sense "is a body"—and the sensual contact in the likeness of animals do not constitute for him the characteristic ways of connecting with the world.[4] Although the connection of the human person with the world begins on the "biological" and sensual basis, it is nevertheless formed in the manner proper to man only in the

orbit of the interior life. Here appears a moment characteristic of the person: man not only appropriates the content that reaches him from the external world and reacts to it in a spontaneous or even downright mechanical manner, but in all his relation to this world, to reality, he attempts to make his mark, to state his "I"—and he has to act this way since this is demanded by the nature of his being. Man has a fundamentally different nature from animals. His nature includes the power of self-determination based on reflection and manifested in the fact that, while acting, man chooses what he wants to do.* This power is called free will.[5]

Thanks to the fact that man—a person—possesses free will, he is also a master of himself, *sui iuris*, as the Latin phrase declares of the person.[6] A second characteristic property of the person remains closely linked to this distinctive feature of his. The Latin of philosophers grasped this property in the statement that the person is *alteri incommunicabilis*—nontransferable, incommunicable.[7] The point in this case is not to emphasize that the person is always some unique and unrepeatable being, as this can also be stated about any other being: about an animal, a plant, or a stone. This nontransferability or incommunicability of the person is most closely linked with his interiority, with self-determination, with free will. No one else can will in my stead.[8] No one can substitute his act of the will for mine. It happens that sometimes someone wants very much for me to want what he wants. What is then best made manifest is this impassable boundary between him and me, the boundary that is determined precisely by free will. I can not want what he wants me to want—and precisely in this I am *incommunicabilis*. I am and should be self-reliant in my actions.[9] All human interactions are based on this presupposition, and the truth about education (*wychowanie*) and about culture is reduced to it.[10]

* The author performed detailed analyses on the power of self-determination and its structure in his study *Person and Act*, part II, titled "Transcendence of the Person in the Act" (Kraków, 1969), 107–196. [*Person and Act*: The Polish editors reference the first Polish edition of Wojtyła's masterpiece *Person and Act* (*Osoba i czyn*) published by the Polish Theological Society in Kraków in 1969. I retained the page references, but also wherever possible I added additional description such as chapters and sections for ease of locating the cited passages in any edition of *Person and Act*. — Trans.]

For man is not only the subject of action, but he also at times is its object.[11] At every step acts occur that have the other man as their object. Within the theme of this book, which is sexual morality, we will continually speak precisely about such acts. In relations between persons of different sex, and especially in sexual intercourse, a woman is constantly an object of some action of a man, and a man, an object of a woman's action. Therefore, first it would be proper to become aware, at least briefly, of who is the one who acts—the subject, and who is the one toward whom the action turns—the object of action. It is already known that both the subject and the object of action are persons. Now, we need to consider well the principles that the action of man must comply with when the object of this action is another human person.*

The first meaning of the verb "to use"

Precisely for this purpose we must thoroughly analyze the verb "to use." It signifies a certain objective form of action. To use means to employ some object of action as a means to an end, namely to the end for which the acting subject strives. The end is always that for the sake of which we act. The end also suggests the existence of means (by means we understand the objects on which our action centers for the sake of the end we intend to attain). By nature, then, a means is subordinated to an end, and, at the same time, it is also to a certain degree subordinated to the one who acts. It cannot be otherwise, since the one who acts makes use of means for the sake of his end—the very expression suggests a subordinate and, so to speak, "servile" relation of the means with respect to the acting subject: the means serves both the end and the subject.

* The term "object" in the expression "the human person as the object of action of another human person" is used in the broad sense, which corresponds to the objectivistic (objective) philosophical perspective that the author adopted from the beginning of the discourse (see footnote, p. 3). This meaning of the object should not be confused with another, more narrow meaning, which the author will apply when speaking about the possibility of treating the human person as an "object of use" (see p. 14). To treat somebody as an object of use means to treat him exclusively as a means to an end, as a thing, without respecting the person's own finality that belongs to him.

So, it seems beyond doubt that various things or beings, which are only individuals, that is, specimens of their species, can and should remain in such a relation to man-person. Man in his diverse activity makes use of the whole created world. He takes advantage of its resources for these ends, which he posits himself, because he alone understands them. This attitude of man toward inanimate nature (*przyroda*), whose riches mean so much to economic life, or toward animate nature (*przyroda*), whose energy and values man assimilates, in principle does not raise doubts. The only thing that is demanded from the rational human being is that he does not destroy and squander these natural resources, and that he uses them with the moderation that will not impede the personal development of man himself and will guarantee for human societies a just and harmonious coexistence. In particular, concerning the relation to animals—the beings endowed with sensation and sensibility to pain—it is demanded from man that the use of these beings never involves torment or physical torture.*

All these are simple principles that are easily understandable by every normal man. The problem begins when a relation to another man, to another human person is concerned. Is it permissible to treat this person as a means to an end and use him in this manner? The problem posited in this question possesses a very broad scope; it extends over many spheres of human life and interactions. Let us take, for example, such cases as the organization of work in a factory, the relation of a commanding officer to a soldier in an army, or even the relation of parents to a child in a family. Does not the employer use a worker, thus a human person, for the purpose of attaining the ends he chose himself?

* Thus, what generates duty in the moral sense with respect to the subject-person is not only persons due to their proper value called dignity, but also non-personal beings due to the inherent value proper to them, in particular living beings, especially those capable of suffering. These beings, however, not only may but even should be treated instrumentally (by becoming an object of use and consumption), whenever such treatment turns out to be the only way of effectively affirming a person or persons. However, purely instrumental treatment of one person for the sake ("for the good") of another or even of all the remaining ones would be impermissible. This essential difference allows us to define the chief ethical principle more narrowly, in relation to the whole scope of the field of moral duty, and to express it in the form of the "personalistic norm," that is, a postulate for the affirmation of the person. The intended narrowing of the scope of this principle is justified by the completely exceptional rank of the personal dignity, that is, of the value incomparable to anything in the world outside the world of persons.

Does not the commanding officer employ soldiers under his command for conducting certain military objectives, which are intended by him and sometimes known only by him? Do not parents, who alone understand the ends for which they educate their children, treat the children in a sense as means to an end, since the children themselves do not understand those ends and do not consciously strive for them? Yet both a worker and a soldier are adults and fully-mature (*pełnowartościowy*)[12] persons, and a child—even if unborn—cannot be denied personhood in the most objective ontological sense, even though it is true that the child is meant to acquire only gradually many characteristics that determine that personhood in the psychological and ethical senses.[13]

The same problem will emerge as we delve deeply into the analysis of the whole reciprocal woman-man relation, which is the basis for the reflections in the field of sexual ethics.* We will discover this problem in, so to speak, various layers of our analysis. Does not a woman in sexual intercourse serve for a man as something of a means for him to attain various ends of his, precisely those ends that he seeks to realize in sexual intercourse? Similarly, does not a man serve for a woman as a means of attaining her own ends?

For the time being let us be content with posing questions that implicate a very essential ethical problem—a problem that is not first of all psychological but precisely ethical.† For a person should not be

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* The author specifies and develops the personalistic understanding of Catholic sexual ethics in a separate article titled "Zagadnienie katolickiej etyki seksualnej. Refleksje i postulaty" (The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 13, fasc. 2 (1965), 5–25; herein after cited as "Zagadnienie katolickiej etyki seksualnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne*.

† The author has dealt a number of times with the distinction between the psychological and the ethical analyses. He took up the problem of the relation between psychology and ethics most extensively in the article "Zagadnienie woli w analizie aktu etycznego" (The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, fasc. 1 (1955–57), 111–135. Psychology and ethics meet at the point of origin, which in this case is the fact of the interior experience of human efficacy (cf. *Person and Act*, 27–106, part I: "Consciousness and Efficacy"). The grasp of the fact of efficacy by contemporary psychology displays the validity of Thomas Aquinas' analyses in this area, as well as a certain shortcoming in the analyses by Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler. Psychology and ethics grasp efficacy as an essential element of the lived-experience of the will, and see the will as the core of experiencing (*przeżywać*) efficacy. At this point, the paths of these two disciplines part, although further analyses still manifest other points of convergence. By the experimental-inductive method, psychology strives for discovering particular mechanisms of the will's

merely a means to an end for another person.* This is excluded due to the very nature of the person, due to what every person simply is. For the person is a subject that is thinking and capable of self-determination—these are two properties that first of all we discover in the interiority of the person. Accordingly then, every person is capable by his nature to define his ends himself.[14] When someone else treats a person exclusively as a means to an end, then the person is violated in what belongs to his very essence and at the same time constitutes his natural right. It is clear that it must be demanded from the person, as a thinking individual, that those ends be truly good, for striving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person.† This also explains the sense of education, both the education of children as well as the reciprocal education of people in general. The point is precisely to seek true ends, that is, true goods as ends of action, and to find and show ways for their realization.

But in this educational activity, especially in the case of educating small children, a person must never be treated as a means to an end. This

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action, for grasping concrete motives that provide a beginning for the realization of a chosen end. On the other hand, ethical analyses strive for a full explication of the lived-experience of efficacy through grasping and characterizing an end—a moral value. Efficacy here is understood as a source of the ethical value, i.e., that through which man becomes good or evil in the moral sense, which can be comprehended *sensu lato* (good or evil interiorly as man), or in a way that is personalistically qualified (true in attitudes and conduct to the value that is the person). [*Sensu lato*: In the broader sense. —Trans.]

* In accord with the intention of the author of this principle, Immanuel Kant (*Uzasadnienie metafizyki moralności* [*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*], Warsaw, 1953, 62), the "merely" here means that the person as the possessor of his nature (understood substantially) can undertake, without harm to himself, a role of, or even serve unknowingly a function of "a means to an end," on the condition that this end of another is honorable, and that the one who "uses" the person's physical or psychological forces is ready to put the person's inalienable value before an end he strives for in a given case, if an axiological conflict of this kind occurs. In the further course of his reflections, whenever the author has in mind the strictly personal (relational) subjectivity of man rather than the substantial one, then he omits the "merely" stating, for example, that "Kant demands that (. . .) we should never treat a person as a means to an end, but always only as an end" (see p. 21 in this book).

† The expression "the nature of the person" can be understood in a twofold sense: 1) "nature" as the essence of a human being that manifests itself in action that is innate to this being and hence in this sense proper; 2) "nature" as the specificity or constitution of the person's strictly personal subjectivity (possessing relational, axiological provenience) that is proper to the person as person (and not as substance). In the further course of his reflections, the author employs both meanings of "nature." Here, both of them come into play together and in solidarity, although each in its own way.

principle has the most universal scope; no one may use a person as a means to an end: neither any man nor even God the Creator.* Indeed, this is excluded most completely on the part of God, because he, by the very fact of giving a rational and free nature to the person, decided that the person himself will define the ends of action and will not serve as a tool for the ends of others. Therefore, if God intends to direct man to some ends, first and foremost he lets him know these ends, so that man can make them his own and strive for them on his own.[15] In this, among others, lies the deepest logic of Revelation: God lets man know the supernatural end, but the decision to strive for this end, its choice, is left to man's freedom.[16] Therefore, God does not save man against his will.

This elementary truth—that the person may not be a means of action as opposed to all other objects of action, which are not persons—is thus the exponent of the natural moral order. Thanks to this truth, this order acquires personalistic properties: the order of nature, which also includes personal beings, must possess such properties. Perhaps it is not irrelevant to add at this point that at the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant formulated this elementary principle of the moral order in the following imperative: "Act in such a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end."[17] In light of the previous reflections, this principle should not so much be formulated in the wording Kant gave to it, but rather as follows: "Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end."[18] The principle thus formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man, especially freedom of conscience.†

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* The author reflects in more detail on the proper interpretation of the laws of God the Creator with respect to the human person in the article "O znaczeniu miłości oblubieńczej" (On the Meaning of Spousal Love), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 22, fasc. 2 (1974), especially 166–172 (see pp. 281–291 in this book).

† For conscience reveals essential *truth* about man as a person, and—according to the author—precisely the relation to truth belongs to the essence of freedom, and of conscience that binds freedom: "Freedom is due to the human person not as pure independence, but as self-dependence, which contains dependence on truth [. . .], and this is most vividly manifested in conscience [. . .]. The proper and complete function of conscience consists in making the act depend on truth" (*Person and Act*, 162–163, in section 2 of chapter IV).

Love as the opposite of "using"

The whole previous reflection on the first meaning of the verb "to use" gives us only a negative solution to the problem of the proper relation to the person. The person may not be either exclusively or first and foremost an object of use, because the role of a blind tool or a means to an end intended by another subject is contrary to the nature of the person.

In turn, when we seek a positive solution to the same problem, then love appears—but only, so to speak, at first glance—as the only distinct opposite of using the person in the role of a means to an end or of a tool of one's own action. For it is evident that I can strive for the other person to will the same good that I will. Clearly, this other person must recognize this end of mine and acknowledge it as a good; he must make it also his own end. Then, between myself and this other person a particular bond is born: the bond of a *common good* and a common end, which binds us. This particular bond is not limited to the fact that we strive together for a common good, but unites the acting persons "from within"—and then it constitutes the essential core of every love. In any case, love between persons is unthinkable without some common good, which binds them.* This good precisely is at the same time the end which both of these persons choose. When different persons consciously choose an end together, this makes them equal to each other, thereby excluding a subordination of one person to another. So, both persons (although more than two persons can be bound by a common end) are in a sense uniformly and equally subordinated to that good, which constitutes a common end. When we look at man, then we perceive in him an elementary need for the good, a

* The common good is understood here basically in a personalistic way. "The point is the truly personalistic structure of human existence in the community to which man belongs. The common good is the good of the community precisely because it creates in the axiological sense the conditions of being together, and action follows that. It can be said that in the axiological order the common good determines a community, a society, or a commune. We define each of these on the basis of the common good that is proper to it. We then take action (*operari*) together with being (*esse*). However, the common good reaches above all to the area of being 'together with others.' The very acting 'together with others' does not yet reveal the common good in such fullness of reality, although it must be present here as well" (*Person and Act*, 308–309, section 6 of chapter VII). (See K. Wojtyła, "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, fasc. 2 [1976], 23.)

natural urge and tendency toward it—although this does not yet manifest the capacity to love. In animals we observe manifestations of instinct that are analogically directed. But instinct itself does not yet determine the capacity to love. People, however, possess such a capacity linked to free will. The capacity to love is determined by the fact that man is ready to seek the good consciously with others, to subordinate himself to this good because of others, or to subordinate himself to others because of this good. Only persons can love.

Love in reciprocal relations between people is not something readily available. Love is first of all a principle or an idea, which people must live up to, so to speak, in their conduct if they want—and they should want—to liberate it from a utilitarian, i.e., consumer (Latin *consumere*—to use up), attitude toward other persons.[19] Let us return for a moment to the examples put forward previously. A serious danger of treating the worker merely as a means exists in the employer-worker relationship; this is demonstrated by various faulty ways of organizing labor. If, however, the employer and the worker arrange their whole interaction in such a way that the common good, which they both serve, will be clearly visible in it, then the danger of treating the person as less than what he truly is will be diminished and almost eliminated. For love will gradually eliminate in the conduct of both interested parties a purely utilitarian or consumer attitude toward the person of the worker. Much has been simplified in this example while retaining only the essential core of the issue. The case is similar with the second example regarding the relation of the commanding officer to the soldier. When both of them are bound by a certain basic attitude of love (of course, the point does not concern the very affection of love) evoked by the shared search for the common good, which in this case is the defense or safety of the homeland, this is simply because they both desire the same thing. We cannot speak merely about using the person of the soldier as a blind tool or a means to an end.

This whole reflection* must be applied in turn to the woman-man relationship, which constitutes the basis of sexual ethics. In this

* The author devoted the last chapter of the book *Person and Act* ("Outline of the Theory of Participation," 285–326) and the article "Osoba: podmiot i wspólnota" to the problem—treated here in a very cursory way—concerning the proper structure of the interpersonal community.

relationship as well—and indeed particularly in it—only love is able to exclude the use of one person by another. Love, as has been said, is conditioned by the common relation of persons to the same good that they choose as an end and to which they subordinate themselves. Marriage is one of the most important areas for realizing this principle. For in marriage, two persons, a woman and a man, unite in such a way that they become in a sense "one flesh" (to use the words of the Book of Genesis), that is, so to speak, one common subject of sexual life.[20] How can it be ensured that a person does not then become for the other—a woman for a man, and a man for a woman—merely a means to an end, that is, an object used to attain only one's own end? In order to exclude this possibility, both of them must then have a common end. Concerning marriage, this end is procreation, progeny, the family, and at the same time the whole constantly growing maturity of the relationship between both persons in all the spheres brought by the spousal relationship itself.

This whole objective finality of marriage fundamentally creates the possibility of love, and fundamentally excludes the possibility of treating the person as a means to an end and as an object of use. However, in order for the former possibility to be realized within the framework of the objective finality of marriage, we must consider more attentively the very principle that excludes the possibility of one person treating another person as an object of use in the whole sexual context. The very recognition of the objective finality of marriage does not yet completely solve the problem.

For it seems that the sexual sphere in particular presents many occasions to treat the person—even unknowingly*—as an object of use. In

* It is evident that for the corresponding act (of benevolence) to be also an act of love it is not enough merely to *want* to affirm the other. What is also needed is that the act taken up by the intention of affirming another person is objectively *suitable* for the role determined by the intention of the agent. Whether it is suitable for this role or not is decided by the objective structure of the person-recipient. Only an accurate recognition of this structure, and taking it into account in action, guarantees that a given act has the mark of a genuine act of love. On the other hand, a faulty recognition of the structure of the person-recipient must become the source of the unknowing and consequently unintentional action to his detriment. This action is all the more dangerous because in this case using the other occurs in the name of love. The agent is unaware of this pretense, and this safeguards him from fault. Nonetheless, he becomes a doer of the act of anti-love out of love! Only being aware

addition, it must be taken into account that the entire sphere of sexual morality is broader than the sphere of conjugal morality alone, and that it encompasses many issues from the area of interaction or even coexistence of men and women. So, within the framework of this interaction or coexistence, all must constantly with all the conscientiousness and with a full sense of responsibility attend to this fundamental good of each and every one—the good that is simply "humanity," or, in other words, the value of the human person. If we treat this fundamental woman-man relationship as broadly as possible and not only within the boundaries of marriage, then love in this relationship is identified with a particular readiness to subordinate oneself to the good that is "humanity," or speaking more precisely, the value of the person, despite the whole distinctiveness of sex. In fact, this subordination by all means obliges in marriage itself, and the objective ends of this institution can be realized only in accord with this broadest principle that results from acknowledging the value of the person in the whole expanded sexual context. This context creates an altogether specific sphere of morality—whereas with respect to science, a specific sphere of ethical problems—in reference to both marriage and many other forms of interaction or simply of coexistence concerning persons of different sex.[21]

The second meaning of the verb "to use"

In order to comprehend these problems in their totality, it is necessary to reflect further on the second meaning that is quite often applied to the verb "to use." Various *emotional-affective* moments or states accompany our thinking and acts of the will, i.e., what constitutes the objective structure of human action. They precede the action itself, go hand in hand with it, or finally manifest themselves in the consciousness of man when the action is already complete.* The emotional-affective

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of the possibility of the danger of such disintegration (emotionalization) of love can lead efficiently to excluding this danger. See the "Introduction to First Edition," where the author formulates a postulate of "introducing love into love."

* See *Person and Act*, 51–56 and 258–275, for a more extensive treatment concerning the relation between consciousness and emotions.

moments or states themselves are a separate theme, as it were, which weaves and forces itself sometimes with great strength and insistence into the whole objective structure of human acts. An objective act itself would at times be something pale and almost unnoticeable to the consciousness of man if it were not manifested and sharply delineated in that consciousness by variously colored emotional-affective lived-experiences.[22] Moreover, these emotional and affective moments or states usually exercise some influence on what determines the objective structure of human acts.

For the time being we shall not analyze this problem in detail, for we shall need to return to it repeatedly throughout the book. At this point, our attention must be directed to one thing only: the emotional-affective moments and states, which mean so much in the whole interior life of man, are in principle colored positively or negatively, as if they contained in themselves a positive or negative interior charge. The positive charge is *pleasure*, whereas the negative one is *pain*. Pleasure occurs in various shapes or shades, depending on the emotional-affective lived-experiences to which it is bound: either as sensual satisfaction, as affective contentment, or as a deep and thorough joy. Pain also depends on the character of the emotional-affective lived-experiences evoking it and occurs in various shapes, kinds, or shades: as sensual pain, as affective discontent, or as deep sorrow.

Here we must turn our attention to the particular richness, variety, and intensity of these emotional-affective moments and states occurring when a person of the other sex is an object of action. They then color this action in a specific way and confer on it some exceptional vividness. This pertains especially to some actions that are linked with the reciprocal relations between persons of different sex and with sexual intercourse itself between a woman and a man. And therefore, precisely within the scope of these actions, the second meaning of the verb "to use" is particularly sharply delineated. To use means to experience (*przeżywać*) pleasure—the pleasure that in various shades is linked to action and to the object of action. It is known that this object of action in the reciprocal relations of a woman and a man and in their sexual intercourse is always a person. And the person becomes a proper source of variously colored pleasure or even delight.

It is an easily understandable fact that precisely one person is for another the source of lived-experiences that have a particular emotional-affective charge. For it is a person who must be for another person an equal object—a "partner" of action. This equality of the subject and the object of action constitutes a particular basis for emotional-affective lived-experiences, and for the emotional-affective positive or negative charges in the form of pleasure or pain that are linked to these lived-experiences. Also, it should not be supposed that a pleasure that is purely and exclusively sensual comes into play here. Such a supposition would diminish the natural greatness of a contact that in every case retains its inter-personal, human character. Even purely "bodily" love, due to the nature of partners who participate in it, does not cease to be a fact of this kind. Hence, for this reason, the sexual life of animals and people cannot be properly compared, although it is clear that in animals this life also exists and constitutes the basis of procreation, thus the preservation and extension of species. In animals, however, it exists on the level of nature and the instinct linked to it, whereas in the case of people it exists on the level of the person and morality. Sexual morality results from the fact that persons not only have a consciousness of the finality of sexual life, but also a consciousness of being persons. The whole moral problem of using as the opposite of loving is linked to this consciousness.[23]

This problem has been delineated previously concerning the first meaning of the verb "to use." The second meaning of this verb is equally important for morality. For man, since he possesses reason, can in his action not only clearly distinguish pleasure or pain, but also in a sense separate them and treat them as a distinct end of action. Then his acts are formed with regard to pleasure alone, which he wants to acquire, or exclusively with regard to pain, which he wants to avoid. Since acts related to the person of the other sex will be formed exclusively or even first and foremost because of that, then that person will become in a particular way only a means to an end—hence, as we can see, the second meaning of the verb "to use" constitutes a particular case of the first meaning. This case, however, is very frequent and can easily occur in the conduct of the man-person. Yet, it does not occur in the sexual life of animals, which takes place exclusively on the level of nature and instinct

and therefore tends solely toward the end which the sexual drive serves, that is, toward procreation, the preservation of species. On this level, sexual pleasure—purely animal, of course—cannot constitute a separate end. It is different with man. Here, it is clear how personhood and rationality generate morality. This morality is in this case subjectively and objectively personalistic—objectively, because what is at stake is the proper relation to the person in the context of sexual pleasure.

The person (of the different sex) may not be for another person merely a means to an end, which is constituted by this sexual pleasure or even delight. A conviction that man is a person leads to accepting the postulate that using should be subordinated to loving. "To use," not only in the first meaning, the broader and objective one, but also in the second meaning, the rather narrower and subjective one—for by its nature the experience (*przeżywanie*) of pleasure is something subjective—may be interiorly ordered and elevated to the level of the persons only by love. Only "loving" excludes "using," also in that second meaning. Therefore, if ethics intends to fulfill its proper task in the area of sexual morality, it must—in the whole abundance and variety of actions, and perhaps also of human lived-experiences linked to this area—accurately distinguish "loving" a person from what is but "using" him, even when it keeps the appearance of love and uses love's name as its own. Consequently, in order to investigate this issue even more thoroughly on the basis of ethics as a scientific system (which after all finds its confirmation in morality that corresponds to it), a critique of so-called utilitarianism is needed.

*Critique of utilitarianism**

From the background of the previous reflections a critique of utilitarianism emerges—utilitarianism as a certain theoretical notion in ethics as well as a practical program of conduct. In this book we will

* Utilitarianism has undergone a significant and complex evolution since the time of its creators. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are known above all for propagating the application of the balance of goods as the only proper method of determining the moral value of acts. However, to the question of *which* goods should be multiplied maximally,

often return to this critique, for utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man's mentality and his attitude toward life. In any case, it is difficult to attribute this mentality and attitude only to modern man—for utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow. Nonetheless, utilitarianism in the modern age is conscious, formulated in respect to its philosophical presuppositions, and specified with scientific precision.

The name itself relates to the Latin verb *uti* (to use, to take advantage) and the adjective *utilis* (useful). In accord with this etymology, utilitarianism emphasizes usefulness in the whole action of man. The useful is what brings pleasure and excludes pain, for pleasure constitutes

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various utilitarians answer differently. Many of them do not share the hedonistic identification of the highest good (that signifies the morally entrusted end of human aspirations) with pleasure (*bonum delectabile*), which was Bentham's position. They consider this good to be the more broadly and objectively understood utility (*bonum utile*). Today there is no shortage of those who consider themselves utilitarians although they understand this good—the highest good—personalistically: they subordinate any calculation of goods to the good (perfection, happiness) of the person treated always and above all as a morally due end of action (*bonum honestum*). Also, to the question of *whose* good ought to be considered while applying the balance of goods, individual utilitarians answer differently, preferring either the variously understood (depending on the answer to the previous question) individual advantage of the subject of action; or the advantage of a selected social group (this group can be also a future generation of mankind, for the happiness of which the people living today should make sacrifices—or be sacrificed); or finally the maximum advantage of the maximum number of people.

The critique below refers to utilitarianism both in its hedonistic version as well as in any other one, insofar as it allows treating the human person instrumentally and reductively (we mean the reduction of the person as value to the value of a function that is served by the person, i.e., to this or that—not necessarily hedonistic—usefulness of the person). This critique, however, does not concern the aforementioned "personalistic" version of utilitarianism.

The balance of goods (whose fundamental idea is, after all, not alien to the Thomistic tradition: see there the issue of *ordo bonorum et caritatis*) has the lesser practical application, the less sensually one comprehends the highest good that constitutes a measure of partial goods. [*Ordo bonorum et caritatis*: The order of goods and of charity. —Trans.] It is no wonder, then, that the first and so to speak classical version of utilitarianism was hedonism.

The author performed an extensive critical presentation of utilitarianism during the lectures conducted at the Philosophical Department of the Catholic University of Lublin in the academic year 1956–57. See *Zagadnienia normy i szczęścia* (Problems of Norm and Happiness). (The typescript in the possession of the Institute of Ethics of the Catholic University of Lublin.)

the essential manifestation of man's happiness. To be happy according to the assumptions of utilitarianism means nothing else but to live pleasantly. It is well known that pleasure itself assumes various shapes and shades. However, there is no need to pay too much attention to that in order to affirm certain pleasures as spiritual or higher while depreciating others, such as sensual, bodily, or material ones. The utilitarian values pleasure as such, for his vision of a man does not discover in that man a distinct composition of matter and spirit as two factors constituting one personal being, which owes its whole specificity precisely to the spiritual soul. For the utilitarian, man is a subject endowed with sensibility and the ability to think. Sensibility makes him desire pleasure and compels him to shun pain. Furthermore, the ability to think, i.e., reason, is given to man for the purpose of directing his action in such a way so as to secure for himself the maximum possible pleasure with the minimum possible pain. The utilitarian considers the principle of maximizing pleasure while at the same time minimizing pain as the chief norm of human morality, adding that it should be applied not only individually, egoistically, but also collectively, socially. In its final formulation, the *principle of utility* (*principium utilitatis*) proclaims the maximum of pleasure for the greatest possible number of people with, of course, the simultaneous minimum of pain for that number.

At first sight this principle seems both right and attractive, for it is difficult to imagine that people could act otherwise, that is, that they could want to find more pain than pleasure both in their individual and collective lives. However, a somewhat more thorough analysis must reveal the weakness and superficiality of this way of thinking and of this principle of normalizing human acts.[24] The essential error lies in the recognition of pleasure alone as the only or the greatest good, to which everything else in the action of man and of human society should be subordinated. But pleasure in itself is not the only good; it is also not the proper end of man's action, as we will have the opportunity to affirm in the course of this work. Pleasure in its essence is something collateral, accidental, something that may occur when acting. Thus, undertaking to act for the sake of pleasure itself as the exclusive or highest end naturally clashes with the proper structure of human acts. I can will or do something that is linked to pleasure, and I can not will or not do something that is linked to pain. I can even will this or not will that, do this

or not do that, because of this pleasure or that pain. This is all true. But I may not treat this pleasure (contrasting it with pain) as the only norm of action, and even less so as a principle based upon which I declare and judge what is morally good and morally evil in my acts or the acts of another person. For it is known that sometimes what is truly good, what morality and conscience command me, is accompanied precisely by some pain and demands forgoing some pleasure. This pain, however, or the pleasure that I forgo in a given case, is not the final criterion for my rational conduct. Besides, it is not something that can be fully determinable in advance. Pleasure and pain are always linked to a concrete act, hence there is no way to determine them in advance or much less to plan or even, as the utilitarians would want, to calculate them. For pleasure is actually something rather elusive.

We could indicate many difficulties and misunderstandings that utilitarianism conceals both in theory and in practice. We will disregard all others in order to pay particular attention to only one, namely to what was also indicated by the resolute opponent of utilitarianism, Immanuel Kant. His name has already been mentioned above in connection with the moral imperative, in which Kant demands that when we act we should never treat a person as a means to an end, but always only as an end. This demand exposes one of the weakest points in utilitarianism: if pleasure is the only and indispensable good and end of man, if it alone constitutes the whole basis of moral norms in human conduct, then consequently everything in that conduct must be treated as a means to this good and end. So even the human person, both my own as well as any other, every one, must be presented in that role. If I accept the presuppositions of utilitarianism, I must look at myself as a subject that wants to have as many sensations and lived-experiences possessing a positive emotional-affective charge as possible, and at the same time as an object that may be used in order to evoke these sensations and lived-experiences. As a result, I also must look at any other person besides myself from the same point of view, that is, inasmuch as he is a means to attain maximum pleasure.

In this form, the utilitarian mentality and attitude must influence various spheres of human life and interaction, although in particular they seem to threaten the sexual sphere. The essential danger consists in this, that with utilitarian presuppositions it is not clear how interaction

and relations between persons of different sex can be placed on the plane of true love, thus liberated by love both from using the person (in the second and in the first meaning of the verb "to use") and from treating the person as a means to an end. Utilitarianism seems to be a program of consistent egoism without any possibility of turning into authentic altruism. For although in the declarations of the representatives of this system we meet with the principle of maximum pleasure ("happiness") for the greatest possible number of people, this principle nonetheless contains a deep interior contradiction. For pleasure by its very essence is a good that is merely temporary, belonging solely to a given subject—it is not a supra-subjective or transsubjective good. So as long as this good is considered to be the complete basis of the moral norm, there can be no way of transcending what is *good only for me*.

We can supplement this only with some fiction, an appearance of altruism. For if, presuming that pleasure is the only good, I strive for maximum pleasure also for the other—and not only for myself, which would then be plain egoism—then I assess this pleasure of the other person through my own pleasure; it brings me pleasure that somebody else feels pleasure. If, however, it brings me no more pleasure or if it does not follow from my "balance of happiness" (the term that the utilitarians very often use), then this pleasure of the other person ceases to be for me something binding, something good, and may even become something evil. Then, according to the presuppositions of utilitarianism, I will strive to eliminate the other person's pleasure because no pleasure of mine is linked to it, or at least I will be indifferent toward the pleasure of another and will not seek it. It is quite clearly visible that with the presuppositions of utilitarianism, the subjective attitude regarding the understanding of good (good as pleasure) leads on a straight path to egoism, even if this may be not deliberate. The only way out of this inevitable egoism is to recognize besides a purely subjective good, i.e., besides pleasure, an *objective good*, which can also unite persons—and then it acquires the characteristics of a common good. This objective common good is the foundation of love, and the persons choosing this common good together at the same time subordinate themselves to it. Thanks to this, they bind one another with the true, objective bond of love, the bond that enables them to liberate themselves from

subjectivism and from egoism inherently concealed in it.* [25] Love is a union of persons.

Consistent utilitarianism can (and has to) counter this objection only with some harmonization of egoisms, which is furthermore questionable since, as we have seen, there is no way out of egoism once utilitarian presuppositions are accepted. Can various egoisms be harmonized? For example, can the egoism of a woman and that of a man be harmonized in the sexual sphere? Certainly, this can be done according to the principle of "maximum pleasure for each of the two persons," but nevertheless the realization of this principle will never lead us out of egoisms. In this harmonization, egoisms will still remain egoisms, with the only difference that these two egoisms, the feminine and masculine, will be for each other mutually useful and mutually advantageous. Once the mutual usefulness and advantage cease, nothing remains from this whole harmony. Love is then nothing in the persons and nothing between them; it is not an objective reality, for the objective good, which constitutes love, is missing. According to such understanding, "love" is a coming together of egoisms that are arranged in such a way so as not to appear to each other as something painful, as something contrary to two-sided pleasure. Hence, by virtue of this understanding, love is an appearance that must be painstakingly maintained in order not to reveal what it truly conceals: egoism—and an egoism that is most rapacious, using another person for one's own sake, for one's "maximum pleasure." Then, the person is and remains merely a means to an end, as Kant rightly observed in his critique of utilitarianism.

Thus, in place of love—love that as a reality present in various persons, for instance, in a concrete man X and in a concrete woman Y,[26] allows them to go beyond the attitude of two-sided and reciprocal use of themselves as means to a subjective end—utilitarianism introduces in their mutual relation the following paradoxical relationship: each person, Y as well as X, fundamentally disposes himself toward securing his own egoism while at the same time agreeing to serve the egoism of

* A more extensive definition of the difference between subjectivism and subjectivity is given below and in *Person and Act*, 56–60 in section 6 of chapter I.

the other person, because this gives him a chance to gratify his own egoism, but of course only inasmuch as this chance is given. This paradoxical relationship between Y and X, which is not only a possible relationship, but which must occur in reality when the utilitarian mentality and attitude are realized, demonstrates that indeed the person here, and not only one's own person, is reduced to the role of a means, a tool. This implicates some logically indispensable and penetrating necessity: I must treat myself as a means and a tool since for my own sake I treat the other in this way. This is the reverse, as it were, of the commandment to love.

The commandment to love and the personalistic norm

The commandment formulated in the Gospel demands from man love for other people, for neighbors (*bližni*); in its full reading, however, it demands love for persons. For God, whom the commandment to love names in the first place, is the most perfect personal Being. The whole world of created persons draws its distinctness and natural superiority in relation to the world of things (non-persons) from its more particular likeness to God. The commandment formulated in the Gospel, while demanding love in relation to persons, remains indirectly in opposition to the principle of utilitarianism, for this principle—as was demonstrated in the previous analysis—is incapable of ensuring love in the relation between human beings, between persons. The opposition between the evangelical commandment and the principle of utilitarianism is indirect inasmuch as the commandment to love does not formulate the very principle on which realizing this love in the relations between persons is possible. Christ's commandment, however, lies in a sense on a different level than the principle of utilitarianism; it is a norm of a different degree. It does not directly concern the same thing: the commandment speaks of love for persons, whereas the principle of utilitarianism indicates pleasure as the basis not only of action, but also of normalizing human actions. Yet, we have stated in the critique of utilitarianism that starting from this basis of normalizing, which that system adopts, we will never be able to arrive at love. For the very

principle of "using," that is, of treating the person as a means to an end, and even to the end that is pleasure—the maximization of pleasure—will always stand in the way of love.

Thus, the opposition between the principle of utilitarianism and the commandment to love results from the fact that on the basis of this principle, the commandment to love simply loses its meaning. Of course, certain axiology is linked to the principle of utilitarianism; according to this axiology, pleasure is the only or the highest value. However, at this point we do not even have to analyze this further. For it becomes clear that if the commandment to love, and love that is the object of this commandment, are to possess meaning, then we must base them on a different principle from the principle of utilitarianism, on another axiology, and on another fundamental norm. In the given case it will be the personalistic principle and norm. As a principle formulated negatively, this norm states that the person is a kind of good that is incompatible with using, which may not be treated as an object of use and, in this sense, as a means to an end. Hand in hand with this goes the positive formulation of the personalistic norm: the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation. And this positive content of the personalistic norm is precisely what the commandment to love brings out.

Can we say in that case that the commandment to love is the personalistic norm? Strictly speaking, the commandment to love is only based on the personalistic norm as a principle containing the negative and positive content, thus—in the strict sense of the word—it is not the personalistic norm. It is only derived from this norm as from a principle (a fundamental norm) that constitutes the proper ground for the commandment to love, whereas the principle of utilitarianism does not constitute this ground. It is necessary to seek this ground of the commandment to love in a different axiology, in a different system of values than the system of utilitarianism—it must be precisely the personalistic axiology, within which the value of the person is always higher than the value of pleasure (and therefore the person cannot be subordinated to pleasure; he cannot serve as a means to the end which is pleasure). So, although strictly speaking the commandment to love is not identified with the personalistic norm, but only presupposes it and the personalistic axiology together with it, speaking more broadly, however, it is

permissible to say that the commandment to love is the personalistic norm. Strictly speaking, the commandment declares: "Love persons," whereas the personalistic norm as a principle says: "The person is a kind of being such that only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation to it." It is evident then that the personalistic norm is a substantiation for the commandment of the Gospel. So, when we take the commandment together with this substantiation, we can say that the commandment is the personalistic norm.

This norm as a commandment defines and commends a certain way of relating toward God and people, that is, a certain attitude toward them. This way of relating, this attitude, is in conformity with what the person is, with the value he represents, and therefore it is honorable. Honorableness (*godziwość*) is superior to utility alone (which is the focus of the principle of utilitarianism) even though it does not cancel utility, but only subordinates it: everything that is honorably useful in relation to the person is contained within the scope of the commandment to love.[27]

By defining and commending a certain way of relating to beings that are persons, a certain attitude toward them, the personalistic norm, as the commandment to love, presupposes not only the honorableness of such a relation, of such an attitude, but also its justice. For it is always just to render what is rightly due to somebody. It is rightly due to the person to be treated as an object of love, and not as an object of use. In a certain sense it could be said that love is a requirement of justice, just as the use of a person as a means would be contrary to this justice. Essentially, the order of justice is more fundamental than the order of love—and in a certain measure even contains it—inasmuch as love can be a requirement of justice. For certainly to love man or God, to love a person, is something just. At the same time, however, love—if its very essence is taken into account—is something above and beyond justice; simply, the essence of love differs from the essence of justice. Justice pertains to things (material goods or also moral goods, e.g., a good name) for the sake of persons, so it pertains to persons rather indirectly, whereas love pertains to persons immediately and directly. The affirmation of the value of the person as such is contained in the essence of love. And if we may rightly say that the one who loves a person is thereby just toward him, it will not be true at all to state that loving a

person consists in being only just toward him. In the course of the book we will attempt to analyze separately and more broadly what constitutes the love of the person. So far, we have explicated one thing, namely that the love of the person must consist in affirming his supra-material and supra-consumer (supra-utilitarian) value. Whoever loves will attempt to show this in his entire conduct. And there is no doubt that this way he will also be just toward the person as such.*

This aspect of the problem, this encounter of love with justice on the basis of the personalistic norm, is very important for the whole of our reflections, which have sexual morality for their object. Precisely here, the basic task is to develop the concept of love that is just to the person, that is, of love that is always ready to give every man what is rightly due to him on account of his being a person. For what is at times considered "love" in the sexual context can quite easily even be unjust for the person. This happens not because sensuality and affectivity take a particular part in the formation of this love between persons of different sex (which we will analyze separately), but rather because, partly unknowingly and partly even consciously, an interpretation based on the utilitarian principle is permitted for love in its sexual context.

This interpretation, in a sense, forces itself into this love by taking advantage of the natural gravitation toward pleasure of the sensual-affective factors contained in this love. There is an easy transition from experiencing (*przeżywanie*) pleasure to not only seeking this pleasure or even seeking it for its own sake, but also considering it as the superior value and the proper basis of a norm. This constitutes the very essence of the distortions that occur in love between a woman and a man.

Thus, because the sexual sphere happens to be so easily associated with the concept of "love," while at the same time being the field of constant attrition between two fundamentally different ways of valuating and two fundamentally different ways of normalizing, namely the personalistic and the utilitarian, it is then necessary in order to clarify

* The point here concerns so-called strict justice (because in the broad, biblical sense "a just man" is the same as "a man of good will"). Strict justice designates a certain minimum that satisfies one's right to certain personal or material benefits. However, since love is true as long as it is not minimalistic, benefits that are just in this strict sense constitute only a basis and a condition of full interpersonal affirmation. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* VII 1–1955a26, and St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* III 130.

the whole issue to state explicitly that this love, which is the content of the commandment in the Gospel, is connected only with the personalistic norm, and not with the utilitarian one.[28] Therefore, we must seek the proper solutions for sexual morality within the scope of the personalistic norm if these solutions are to be Christian. They must be based on the commandment to love. However, although man completely realizes the commandment to love in its full evangelical sense through supernatural love of God and neighbors, this love nonetheless does not conflict with the personalistic norm and is not realized in isolation from it.

Perhaps, at the end of these reflections, it is worth recalling the distinction St. Augustine made between *uti* and *frui*, by which he distinguished two attitudes.[29] The one that tends to pleasure alone, disregarding the object, is exactly *uti*. The other, which finds joy in the fully-mature relation to the object because this relation is precisely what the nature of this object demands, he called *frui*. The commandment to love indicates the path to this *frui* also in the mutual interaction of persons of different sex, both in marriage and outside of it.